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Introduction
The objective of this study is to better understand Central American and Caribbean governments' ability to service their debt, derived from the estimation of their fiscal limits, defined as the maximum level of debt that they are able and willing to service (Bi and Leeper, 2010) . Using simulations of state-dependent fiscal limits for 18 economies, 2 we produced results that were not previously available for these economies. These results
show varying and wider distribution limits for the simulations when applying an open economy model subject to terms-of-trade shocks versus the same model without considering these shocks. The results indicate that terms-of-trade volatility impacted the ability of these developing economies to service their debt.
The paper provides another critical tool to policymakers and central bankers to help determine the best way to understand fiscal limits derived from simulating macroeconomic uncertainty and fiscal policy interactions in the developing economies of Central America and the Caribbean.
The methodologies used analyses the fiscal limit. Fiscal limit is defined the maximum level of debt that governments can service given the current underlying macroeconomic fundamentals, the present value of fiscal surpluses, the state of government transfers and subsidies, and the impact of sovereign risk on the economy. (Bi 2011; Juessen et al., 2011) . Using an open economy real business cycle (RBC) model for simulating fiscal limits, we derive dynamic Laffer curves, which are obtained endogenously as governments normally raise the tax rate in response to rising debt levels (Leeper 1991) . This understanding of the fiscal limit, or the maximum level of debt that Central American and Caribbean economies can service, is critical for these small developing economies, some of which currently have high spending levels due to transfers and subsidies and a history of high political risk that thwarts tax and spending adjustment across the business cycle. These economies commonly experience low and declining fiscal surpluses, accompanied by rising sovereign debt, especially following the great recession. They continue to be impacted, sometimes negatively, by the state of world trade and the economies of their leading trade partners. An understanding of fiscal limits within these economies is vital, as policymakers and central bankers are continually searching for methodologies and tools that can help them better define these limits, provide more robust forecasts of the ability of their economies to raise debt, and develop the fiscal policies necessary for containing debt and default risk in the short and long term (Bi 2011; Bi et al., 2013) .
Our paper provides evidence of fiscal limits for all the economies studied. It shows, through simulation of fiscal limits in an open economy model, that terms-of-trade shocks play an important role in shaping fiscal limit distribution for most of the economies included in the study.
The study is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the reasons why studying fiscal limits is important to developing economies. Section 3 reviews the latest literature on fiscal limits. Section 4 discusses the methodologies, the data, and the parameters used in deriving the simulation of the fiscal limits. Section 5 discusses the results of the simulation, Section 6 discusses the policy implications, and Section 7 concludes.
Why Understanding Fiscal Limits is Important to Developing Economies
The fiscal limit is usually the highest level of debt that the government can service. It is dependent on the current state of the macroeconomic fundamentals, the present value of fiscal surpluses, the state of government transfers and subsidies, and the impact of sovereign risk on the economy (Bi 2011; Bi et al., 2013) . The simulations of the limits are demonstrated in endogenously derived dynamic Laffer curves. The peak of the distribution curve shows the point at which governments are limited in further raising tax revenues to finance sovereign debt, indicating their ability to adequately service sovereign debt.
Usually, even before this point is reached, and with the increasing possibility of reaching the peak of the Laffer curve, householders or agents will require a higher risk premium on sovereign debt, which could also limit financing of sovereign debt (Uribe, 2006) .
The fiscal limit, which is state-dependent on existing macroeconomic fundamentals and stochastic in nature as random disturbances affect the future path of fiscal surpluses, is effectively defined at each period and depends on macroeconomic circumstances and fiscal policy (Bi et al., 2013; Juessen et al., 2011; Leeper, 1991) .
Depending on current macroeconomic circumstances and fiscal policy, several results can emerge that define the state of fiscal limits and the ability of the government to service its debts. First, a government with a high burden of transfers and government spending will most likely experience lower fiscal surplus for an extended period, lower-bound fiscal limits, and a diminished ability to service its debt. Additionally, governments that use strong automatic stabilisers as countercyclical fiscal policy in periods of low economic growth will have lower surpluses as income remains depressed and will face greater difficulty in servicing sovereign debt. Furthermore, random exogenous shocks to economies can negatively impact the future path of fiscal surpluses, making it increasing difficult for governments to service their debt and maintain their current sovereign credit rating. (Bi, 2011; Bi et al., 2013; Leeper, 1991) . Table 2 .1 and Figure 5 in the Appendix showing public debt to GDP). Over the past decade, the fiscal limits of several developing economies have signalled to credit markets more riskiness in their sovereign debt, which has resulted in the downgrading of the creditworthiness of these economies. The Bahamas A-* BBB - the maximum amount a government could borrow, which they termed a "natural debt limit."
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However, the analysis held interest rates constant. Buffie et al. (2012) used an exogenously determined risk premium, as economies were not allowed to default on sovereign debt.
Our paper derives endogenously determined fiscal limits from economic fundamentals and fiscal policy, recognizing that sovereign default may occur if existing debt levels exceed fiscal limits because rising tax rates are unable to cover mounting debt.
We incorporate terms-of-trade shocks in our open general equilibrium model, recognizing that most developing economies, in addition to relying heavily on external borrowing, export significant amounts of their domestic production, with changes in terms of trade magnifying sovereign default risk (Bi et al., 2013) . We produce results for developing economies that were not previously available to aid policymakers and central bankers in formulating fiscal consolidation and reform in both the short and long term.
Models, Data, and Parameters
4.1: Model
Since the main objective of this study is to approximate the fiscal limit for a set of small, open developing economies, we use the approach employed by Bi et al. (2013) to analyse this topic in three developing economies. The model consists of a small, open economy with tradable and nontradable goods to consider the role of terms-of-trade and exchange rate shocks in the distribution of fiscal limits. We provide a brief description of the model, and we refer readers to the Bi et al. (2013) paper for details.
Households
Households derive utility from the consumption of a bundle containing a private and public,̃ , and leisure 1 − . The composite is a CES index of both types of goods
where and are the participation of the consumption of private good in the basket, and the degree of substitutability, respectively.
Preferences are characterized by the following utility function, that households maximize over an infinite horizon choosing optimal paths for composite goods, labor, investment, and capital in the tradable and nontradable sectors:
, where ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, σ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and is the weight of leisure in the utility function.
Subject to budget constraints,
where , , , represent sector-specific investment expenditure and capital. The spending in investment goods is subject to adjustment cost with the parameter , where this feature is necessary to close the model in the terminology of Schmith-Grohe and Uribe (2003) . Finally, is the rate of capital depreciation, assumed to be the same in both sectors.
The law of motion of sectoral capital is:
and the aggregate investment is:
The first-order condition of this optimization program delivers the following intertemporal equilibrium condition for households:
Aggregate private consumption and investment are split between tradables and nontradables in an imperfect substitutability way, through a CES aggregate function with intratemporal elasticity of substitution of and home bias degree of .
In terms of the distribution of labor between sectors, the CES aggregator is
where is the steady-state share of labor in the nontradable sector and is the elasticity of substitution between sectors. The household chooses the optimal amount of labor for each sector, solving the intratemporal problem:
From the first-order condition we obtain the labor supply for each sector:
From the last cost minimization problem, the aggregate wage index can be derived as:
In this model, prices are presented as relative prices respect to the price of the composite private consumption good, which is set to 1. Defining as the relative price of nontradables, and as CPI real exchange rate (assuming the law of one price holds), where and are the levels of production, and and at are the total factor of productivity that follows an AR(1) process. is the productivity shock that is assumed to be the same for both sectors. 
Government
In this model, the government collects taxes and issues an external debt bond ( * ) to finance public expenditure ( ), transfers ( ), and the external debt service. In terms of public expenditure, the government consumes both tradables and nontradables, so is represented as a CES basket of these types of goods. Thus, the price index for government goods is given by:
where is the degree of home bias and is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution.
The government flow budget constraint is given by:
where is the price of foreign bonds and * is the number of units of local goods raised through the sale of * . In Bi et al. (2013) ,
are the post-default liabilities introduced to study the dynamic of fiscal limits when the government randomly defaults. In our research, we do not study that case, so Δ = 0.
We assume that foreign creditors are risk-neutral, so the demand for domestic bond is = .
Iterating forward, and using the transversality condition for government, lim →∞ + * = 0, the government budget constraints is can be rewritten as:
that is, the external debt at the start to period t is the present value of future surpluses.
The evolution of fiscal policy variables is the following: government expenditure, , is assume to be procyclical, as the evidence suggests for developing countries (Gavin and Perotti, 1997) . Relative to taxes, the policy rule establishes that taxes adjust to maintain sustainability. Thus, the expenditure and taxes rules are 
Market Clearing
The market-clearing conditions require that factor markets clear, so labor and capital supplies are equal to their respective demands in each market and at the aggregate, so
The output in local units is:
= +
The market-clearing condition for nontradables is: 
Defining the Fiscal Limit
As in Bi et al. (2013) , the fiscal limit is defined as the maximum level of debt per unit of local goods that a government is able and willing to serve. Based on the definition of government budget constraint, the fiscal limit can be described as the present value of future surpluses evaluated at the top of the Laffer curve.
Willingness to pay is approached by a political risk factor bounded by the range 0 and 1, so that low levels of these parameters reflect high levels of political risk, and consequently, lower levels of fiscal limits. In other words, countries with high levels of political risk are more prone to default at lower debt-to-GDP ratios.
One of the characteristics of fiscal limits is its state-dependent nature. This implies that fiscal limits are random variables, as the state of the economy at each moment is determined by random shocks. In this model, these shocks are productivity, term of trade processes, and the evolution of fiscal policy, each of which has a random component.
Formally, from the intertemporal budget constraint evaluated at the distribution of fiscal limit is:
where the state of the economy is ℌ = ( , , , −1 , −1 ). and are government revenue and the real exchange rate associated with . is the government willingness to pay the public debt or the level of political risk, which we assumed constant.
As Bi et al. (2013) note, the computation of the maximum tax, consistent with dynamic Laffer curves, delivers values slightly above those observed in the sample, so that fiscal limits are evaluated at the maximum tax rate observe in the sample.
The simulation of the fiscal limit distribution involves the following steps:
1. Using the procedure described by Bi et al, (2013) , we solve the nonlinear model for each country and obtain the decision rules for the state variables of the model.
2. After solving, we simulate the model 1,000 periods, randomly drawing the exogenous shocks for TPF, government expenditure, and term of trade, and compute + and . Then, we compute the definition of fiscal limit for this sequence of shocks.
3. We repeat the simulation 10,000 to have { (ℌ )} =1 10,000
Data
Parameters and Calibration of the Model
The model is calibrated for 18 Caribbean and Central America economies to simulate the distribution of fiscal limits. To accomplish this task, our calibration strategy assumes that some parameters are common across economies, and the rest are obtained from sample data of key model variables for these economies.
Because of the lack of previous studies or empirical evidence, we rely on Bi et al.
(2013)'s calibration and other studies for common parameters. Table 4 .1 summarizes these common calibrated parameters. The tradable share in the consumption price index ( ) is set at 0.5 for the countries considered, similar to the value estimated for the Dominican Republic (0.49) 3 and Bi et al. (2013) , which set this parameter to 0.53 for Ecuador and Argentina.
From the parameterization of Bi, et al. (2013) we take: , the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of supply, which is set to 2, a common assumption in the literature. The elasticity of substitution between the private good and the public good in the composite consumption basket of the household ( ) calibrated to 0.49 and , the preference weight on in effective consumption is set to 0.8. The elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods in both private and public consumption basket is calibrated to 0.44.
The sectoral mobility of labor, , is set to 1. In addition, , the steady-state labor income share of nontradable sector in labor income, is equal to 0.5. Finally, the investment adjustment parameter is set to 1.7.
Other common parameters across countries are the labor income shares of national income ( ) which are calibrated to 0.5. We assume that both sectors have the same labor intensive technology, so = 0.5. Steady-state labor share is set to 0.25, which means that households spend 25 percent of their day at work. Finally, as our model is calibrated on annual data, the depreciation rate of capital is 10 percent per year in both sectors.
The country-specific parameters are calibrated using annual data on per capita After detrending, using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, we estimate the persistence and volatility parameters for the exogenous processes (productivity, terms of trade, and fiscal policy variables). To obtain reliable parameters, we include dummy variables to control outliers in years of financial or important crisis. Finally, data for the political risk parameter is taken from the International Country Risk Guide's Index of Political Risk. Table 4.2 shows calculated parameters for each economy.
The discount factor, , was computed using average ex-post real interest rates for each country. The average ex-post real rate is around 9 percent, which implies a discount Persistence and volatility parameters vary widely across countries. Productivity shocks are more persistent than the average in countries like Honduras, Panama, and Trinidad and Tobago. Nevertheless, the volatility of productivity shocks is similar across countries. Terms-of-trade shocks, approximated by the persistence and volatility of the deviation of real exchange rate from its HP trend, display heterogeneity in the set of countries, with an average persistence of 0.38 and volatility of 3.8 percent.
With respect to fiscal parameters, the ratio of government expenditure to GDP on average is 25 percent, with countries with traditionally low levels like Guatemala (14 percent), the Dominican Republic (16 percent), and Costa Rica (17 percent). Except for
The Bahamas, countries in the Lesser Antilles have the highest average government expenditure in the sample, with Barbados at the top, at 37 percent of GDP.
Similar to the distribution of the ratio of public expenditure to GDP, government revenues over GDP are smaller in the Central America countries mentioned. The sample average for these economies is 14 percent versus the average of the full sample of 22 percent.
Finally, average public debt to GDP is 63 percent with a standard deviation of 33 percent. The Lesser Antilles countries and Jamaica all have debt-to-GDP ratios greater than 50 percent, with countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Jamaica, and St. Kitts standing out with ratios over 100 percent. Central America and the Greater Antilles countries (excluding Jamaica and Nicaragua) exhibit ratios under 50 percent.
In terms of parameters characterizing the assumed behavior of fiscal policy, government spending behaves in a procyclical manner with respect to GDP, meaning that government spending is reduced when economic growth slows down. Of the sample countries, only Belize and St. Lucia display countercyclical behavior. The tax-to-debt adjustment elasticity suggests that these countries tend to raise taxes when debt rises. By determining the fiscal limits, we recognized that economies' sovereign default risk increases as existing debt levels exceed the endogenously determined Laffer curves, as rising tax revenues will be increasing unable to cover the mounting debt. Our paper studies the developing economies of Central America and the Caribbean, including termsof-trade and flexible exchange rate regime shocks, as these economies are heavily reliant on external borrowing and export earnings, with increased volatility in terms of trade and exchange rate changes elevating sovereign default risk through their balance sheets. (Bi et al., 2013) . Our results, outlined below, provide policymakers and central bankers with results not previously available for these 18 economies. 
